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Blaine it on Politics: The (Non-) Effect of Anti-Aid Amendments on Private School Choice
Programs in the U.S. States

James G. Blaine was a prominent American politician of the late 19th Century. Although Blaine
was an unsuccessful Republican candidate for President in 1884, U.S. Secretary of State,
Speaker of the House, and a Senator from Maine, his primary legacy was the enshrinement of
"anti-aid" amendments in the constitutions of 39 U.S. states. These so-called "Blaine
Amendments" were designed to prohibit government funds from supporting "sectarian" religious
organizations such as schools and charities. In Blaine's day, "sectarian" was widely understood
to be a euphemism for "Catholic". Nondenominationally Protestant organizations such as the
public schools of the day were considered to be non-sectarian and entirely worthy of government
support. The Blaine Amendments ensured that government-sponsored schools in the U.S. would
be pervasively Protestant, at least until religion was banned from public schools in the 1960s,
and that Catholic schools would have to make do without any substantial financial assistance
from the government.
Several U.S. courts and legal analysts have decried the "shameful pedigree" of the Blaine
Amendments as instruments of anti-Catholic bigotry.1 The main question before us here,
however, is not whether or not the Blaine Amendments are laudatory but whether or not they are
efficacious. Specifically, do Blaine Amendments appear to influence whether or not states adopt
and implement government-sponsored private school choice programs in the U.S. states? If not,
do they at least affect the legal form that such programs take? If Blaine Amendments do not

1

See for example Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Ira C. Lupu, “The Increasingly Anachronistic Case
Against School Vouchers,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 13 (1999); Joseph P. Viteritti,
Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil Society (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1999).
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seem to influence the enactment or design of private school choice programs, why is that the
case?
Our answers to these questions, though merely suggestive, are quite surprising. We find
that states with Blaine Amendments are at least as likely as states without them to have private
school choice programs that result in government money funding sectarian religious
organizations through the decisions of parents. Moreover, although financing private school
choice through corporate or personal tax credits is often viewed as a necessary "Blaine
workaround", states with private school choice programs and Blaine Amendments actually are
less likely to fund them indirectly through the tax side, as opposed to directly through general
government funds, than are states with private school choice programs that lack such anti-aid
provisions in their constitutions. Blaine Amendments are not prohibiting U.S. states from
implementing programs that result in students attending private sectarian schools at government
expense. Senator Blaine is likely turning over in his grave, as government-sponsored private
school choice involving sectarian religious schools is alive and well even in many U.S. states
with constitutional provisions that could be interpreted as preventing just such a thing.
What explains the apparent fecklessness of Blaine Amendments in prohibiting school
voucher and tax-credit scholarship programs? Although our limited statistical analysis prevents
us from ruling out confounding factors as explanations for why government-funded private
school choice is thriving in U.S. states with Blaine Amendments and absent from many states
without anti-aid amendments, we suspect that the reason is politics. Whether or not a private
school choice program enacted by a state legislature is judged to be constitutional appears to
depend more upon the political ideology of the justices doing the judging than on the
restrictiveness of the state constitution in question. State courts dominated by justices elected as
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or appointed by Republicans tend to judge private school choice programs to be constitutional,
regardless of whether or not the state constitution has a Blaine Amendment. State courts
dominated by justices elected as or appointed by Democrats tend to judge private school choice
programs to be unconstitutional, again regardless of whether or not the state constitution has a
Blaine Amendment. If you don't like the private school voucher court rulings in a particular
state, Blaine it on politics.
This paper weaves together theoretical, historical, political, and legal analyses. First, we
explicate two countervailing theoretical positions on judicial behavior. Second, we describe the
religious and political context in which the Blaine Amendments originally were proposed and
adopted. Third, we examine the number and types of private school choice programs that have
been enacted in Blaine and non-Blaine states, to show that the existence of a Blaine Amendment
itself is insufficient to prevent government-financed private school choice programs from
flourishing. Our review of the substantive content of the major state-level court opinions
regarding private school choice and the Blaine Amendments is the fourth section of the paper
and shows the general lack of consistency in both the rulings themselves and their legal
justifications. Fifth, we draw upon measures of the ideological leanings of the courts that have
ruled in Blaine cases to demonstrate that, in the end, as in the beginning, it all boils down to
politics. The sixth section concludes.

1. Contrasting Theories of Judicial Behavior
Space constraints prevent a full discussion here of the extensive literature on judicial behavior.
Instead, we simply provide an overview of two contrasting judicial theories relevant to our topic:
Constitutionalism and Judicial Politics.

4

The theory of Constitutionalism argues that judges arrive at their rulings in cases based
on a reasonably objective read of the relevant constitutional provisions and existing statutes.2
Constitutionalism is anchored in the famous statement in Federalist 78:

…[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a
capacity to annoy or injure them… The Judiciary…has no influence over either
the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment (emphasis in original).3

The central idea of the judicial theory of Constitutionalism, especially when combined with the
judicial practice of stare decisis, is that judges have to accept what is given to them and cannot
shape the context in which their rulings are made. According to Constitutionalism, the outcomes
of court decisions should be predictable based on the Constitution, relevant statutes, and the facts
of a particular case. The characteristics of the judges involved should be largely irrelevant to
court rulings, according to Constitutionalism, because it is not their will that be done.
The main general theory competing with Constitutionalism to explain judicial rulings is
Judicial Behaviorism, also called Judicial Politics. David Truman generally is viewed as the
father of the behavioral movement in political science and Robert Dahl solidified the behavioral
2

The classic work on this topic is Edward S. Corwin, Corwin on the Constitution: The Judiciary, edited by Richard
Loss (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
3

Attributed to Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist 78,” The Federalist, edited with an introduction by Edward Mead
Earle (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 504. For an elaboration on the judicial theory embedded in Federalist
78 see Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd Edition (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986).
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school of thought with a number of theoretical and applied works.4 Starting in the mid-1950s,
social scientists began applying the principles of behaviorism to the functions of the courts.5
According to the Judicial Behavior school of thought, the attitudes, preferences, and political
ideologies of justices most influence their decisions. The judiciary does have will, contrary to
Federalist #78, and by understanding the characteristics of judges that shape their will one can
predict how they will rule on cases almost regardless of the constitutional and statutory
constraints involved.
The Constitutional and Behavioral schools of thought provide us with sharply contrasting
views of what influences judicial decisions. The Constitutionalists view constitutional and legal
provisions as determinative, again given the facts of the case. According to Constitutionalism,
variations in rulings across judges and courts are simply random error in judgment and not due to
any systematic bias in the judiciary. The Behaviorists respond that judicial preferences trump
even constitutional provisions in determining the outcomes of cases. They hold that
constitutional and legal constraints hold plenty of wiggle room for judges to maneuver towards
rulings that are consistent with their personal and political preferences. Variation in rulings
across judges are not random error in the view of Behaviorialists, they are instead systematic
variation explained by the preferences and ideologies of justices. There may be few tougher tests

4

David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1951);
Robert Dahl, “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest,”
American Political Science Review 55 (1961); Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1991); Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1961).
5

See for example Victor G. Rosenblum, Law as a Political Instrument (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Robert Dahl,
“The Role of the Supreme Court as National Policy Maker,” Journal of Public Law 61 (1957); Glendon Schubert,
Constitutional Politics (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1960); Stuart Nagel, “Sociometric Relations Among
American Courts,” Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 43 (1962); H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda
Setting in the United States Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
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for the Judicial Behavior school of thought than state Blaine Amendments and private school
choice. It is to that substantive topic of this paper that we now turn.

2. The Genesis of Blaine Amendments
State Blaine Amendments are provisions found in 39 state constitutions that prohibit
appropriating public funds to aid religious schools. Some of these anti-aid amendments also
prohibit government financial support of religious colleges, hospitals and social service agencies
such as orphanages. They take their name from a failed effort to amend the federal Constitution
in 1876, at a time long before the U.S. Supreme Court began applying the federal religion
clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First
Amendment, to the states in the 1940's, effectively making federal law control state activities as
well as federal actions. The failed federal amendment is named for its author, Senator James G.
Blaine of Maine. Blaine sought the Republican Party nomination to succeed President Ulysses
S. Grant, who had requested such an amendment in a speech supporting the need for both free
public schools in every state and denying public funds to sectarian schools. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized, "sectarian" was a code word for Catholic6 and thus the Amendment
requested by Grant and introduced by Blaine was intended to prevent any funding of Catholic
schools. Blaine hoped to ride the publicity garnered by his anti-Catholic Amendment to the
Republican nomination, as the Catholic vote was already almost exclusively Democrat, and the
amendment appealed to Republican and Protestant voters.7
The Amendment offered by Senator Blaine would have prohibited states from funding
religious common schools operated by one sect, and many state Blaine Amendments follow that
6

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).

7

Steven K. Green, "The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered," American Journal of Legal History 36 (1992), p. 38.
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pattern, and can be considered "classic Blaines." They prohibit aid to religious elementary and
secondary schools, the modern day successors to the common schools of the past. Blaine
modeled his Amendment on earlier provisions that several states had already incorporated into
their constitutions, either when enacting their first constitution, such as Michigan did in Article
1, Section 4 of its 1836 Constitution, or by amendment, as Massachusetts did in 1855 in adding
its amended Article XVIII, Section 2. These amendments that pre-date the failed federal Blaine
amendment can be considered "proto-Blaines." Some states, as previously noted, have enacted
Blaine Amendments with a broader prohibition that precludes aid to sectarian colleges, in some
cases, and still other religious institutions in other cases, encompassing sectarian hospitals and
orphanages, for example. These can be considered "super-Blaines."
As Joseph Viteritti has written:

…[T]he history of the original Blaine Amendment and its progeny in the states
underscores one of the most incredible ironies in American constitutional
law. Strict separationists often point to these local provisions as safeguards of
religious freedom, using them to prevent objectionable interaction between
government and religious institutions. In fact, the Blaine Amendment is a remnant
of nineteenth century religious bigotry promulgated by nativist religious leaders
who were alarmed at the growth of immigrant populations and who had a
particular disdain for Catholics.8

8

Joseph Viteritti, "Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law," Harvard
Journal of Law & Pub Policy 21 (1998), p. 659.
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Far from being religiously-neutral provisions designed to prevent the State from directly or
indirectly aiding a state-established religion, the state Blaine amendments, like the federal
counterpart from which their name derives, in fact were designed to rebuff efforts of the Catholic
Church for a share of the school funds provided to public schools, which were at the time
nondenominationally Protestant in orientation. It is simply impossible to understand the proper
interpretation and original meaning of these provisions without first understanding that the
common schools (as public schools used to be known) were originally intended to be, and
functioned as, religious schools.9
The common schools -- created by the founders of the Common School Movement,
Horace Mann of Massachusetts and Henry Barnard of Connecticut and Rhode Island -- were
unabashedly Protestant in orientation, intended to inculcate in all children attending them a
generic Protestantism acceptable to most if not all Protestant denominations. As Charles Glenn
has said, "The common school was intended, by its proponents, above all as the instrumentality
by which the particularities of localism and religious tradition and (in the United States) of
national origin would be integrated into a single sustaining identity;"and moreover "the common
school that Mann and others sought to create was profoundly and explicitly religious and
saturated with moral purpose."10

9

See Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and the American Republic, 1780-1860 (1983), p. 98
("The growing antagonism between Protestants and Catholics may have helped Protestants close ranks on the issue
of religion in the public schools. Education officials, legislators, and essayists agreed on the propriety of Christian
Bible reading in the public schools. Predominantly Protestant themselves, they endorsed the notion that there was a
common core of scripture and belief among Christians, and they had no qualms about supporting a common-school
policy that was openly Christian, avowedly nonsectarian, and implicitly Protestant."); see also David Tyack, Thomas
James, and Aaron Benavot, Law and the Shaping of Public Education, 1785-1954 (1987), p. 163 ("Throughout most
of American history, local majorities seemed to have their way with religious elements in the curriculum. These
local majorities were typically Protestant, and the compromise they favored--teaching the King James Bible without
comment--was hardly fair to Catholics, Jews, and non-believers.").
10

Charles Leslie Glenn, The Myth of the Common School (1987), pp. 9 and 14. See also Lloyd P. Jorgenson, The
State and the Non-Public School: 1825-1925 (1987), p. 38 ("Although he had abandoned the Puritanism of his
forebears, Mann's writings bear eloquent witness to his burning conviction that non-sectarian [Protestant] religion

9

Protestant reactions to Catholic objections to the Protestant nature of the public schools
ranged from unsympathetic to vicious. Although there had been earlier outbreaks of antiCatholic violence, such as the burning of the Ursuline Convent in Charlestown, Massachusetts,
in 1834, in 1844 rumors that the Philadelphia school authorities were going to end the practice of
reading from the Protestant King James Bible in response to Catholic protests led to two
extended bouts of rioting that left some 44 persons dead and several Catholic churches burned.
Their efforts to receive accommodations to their religious beliefs in the common schools having
consistently failed, the Catholic church authorities determined to create a system of parochial
schools so that their co-religionists could avoid the increasingly inhospitable public schools.11
Shortly after the Philadelphia Bible Riots, Catholics in New York requested that they
receive a proportionate share of the public school funds so that they could operate their own
schools. Although New York Governor Seward initially agreed to the request, the Protestant
reaction led the legislature to reject the proposal unequivocally.
Catholic demands for a share of the common school funds for their schools persisted,
however, and it was to rebuff those demands that early proto-Blaine Amendments such as that
passed by Massachusetts in 1855 were enacted. As Douglas Laycock has explained, aid to
religious schools did not become a controversial subject until Catholics began demanding the
same support for their schools as that given to the generically Protestant public
was an essential element of education.... An Episcopalian layman of orthodox religious views, Barnard was entirely
convinced of the necessity of religious instruction in the schools, and he admonished that Christ was the first great
teacher.") and Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil Society (1999), p.
150 ("The common school was meant to function as an instrument for the acculturation of immigrants, making them
good, productive citizens in the image of the governing majority. The Bible, the Protestant Bible was a sacred
implement to their cause".)
11

Viteritti notes that the common school curriculum had evolved from "its open embrace of mainstream
Protestantism to a blatant anti-Catholicism," citing to a study of more than a thousand commonly used textbooks of
the nineteenth century public schools that found that one of two prevalent themes was "a fierce anti-Catholicism in
which the church was portrayed as a national threat, loyal to a foreign power in Rome." Viteritti, supra note 3, p.
152, internal footnote omitted.
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schools.12 Massachusetts passed its proto-Blaine Amendment when the nativist, anti-Catholic
Know Nothing Party swept to total control of the state government in the 1854 elections.
Support for the public schools and opposition to any subsidies for Catholic "sectarian" schools
were two planks of the Know Nothing's platform in the 1850's.13 While the Know Nothings as a
political party disappeared in the late 1850's, most of them were absorbed into the new
Republican Party. By the time President Grant, himself a former Know Nothing,14 requested a
federal constitutional amendment prohibiting all states from funding "sectarian" schools, 14
states had already enacted legislation or constitutional provisions prohibiting the use of public
funds for non-public religious schools.15 Although the Federal Blaine Amendment Grant had
requested passed the House of Representatives by the required two-thirds majority it fell several
votes short of a two-thirds majority in the Senate. The Republican-dominated Congress then
began requiring through its enabling legislation that constitutions of new states include Blaine
Amendment provisions, so that by 1890 29 states had such provisions.16 Ten more states
adopted Blaine Amendments subsequent to 1890.
Not content with ensuring that no public funds were provided directly to "sectarian"
schools, public school advocates had repeatedly sought to get states to require that all students
attend the public schools by means of compulsory attendance laws. Although initially successful
in Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Illinois, legislation to this effect had been reversed due to
12

Douglas Laycock, “Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty,” George Washington Law Review
60 (1992), p. 845.
13

Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850's (1992).

14

Id., p. 274. Anbinder notes that while Grant only revealed he was a Know Nothing in his posthumously published
memoirs, both of his vice presidents, Schuyler Colfax of Indiana and Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, had been
prominent Know Nothings.
15

Viteritti, supra note 3, p. 670.

16

Id., p. 673.
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public outcry.17 In 1922, however, Oregon passed an initiative requiring attendance exclusively
at public schools. When two private schools, including a Catholic school, sued in federal court
because the initiative would put them out of business, the case ultimately reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, which in 1925 delivered its landmark decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
affirming the right of parents to send their children to non-public schools. The Supreme Court
held that "the child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
responsibilities.”18 In a very real sense, Pierce lay the foundation stone for the modern school
choice movement, because if the Supreme Court had upheld the Oregon initiative there might
well be no private marketplace in education today. But just as the Court’s Pierce ruling made
private school choice possible in theory, we might expect that the restrictive Blaine Amendments
might proscribe and government support of private school choice in particular states. It is to that
question, which is at the heart of our paper, that we now turn.

3. Are Blaine Amendments an Obstacle to School Choice? An Empirical Analysis.
In the 2011-12 school year, over 200,000 students used a voucher or tuition tax credit to attend a
private school. These students participated in one of 25 programs in 14 states across the country
(See Table 1 for a full list).19 Voucher programs are financed through general revenues and
administered by governments, either directly or by contract with a program implementer.
Tuition tax-credit programs are funded indirectly, by providing a full or partial tax credit to
corporations or individuals who donate to a scholarship-providing non-profit organization and
17

Jorgenson, supra note 5, pp. 186-204.

18

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. (1925), p. 535.

19

New programs have been added so far in 2012 in Louisiana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
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Table 1. School Choice Programs in the U.S., 2011-12 School Year
Blaine
Location
Amendment?
Arizona
YES
Arizona
YES
ArizonaYES
Lexie’s Law
Florida
YES
Florida
YES
Georgia
YES
Georgia
YES

Year
Enacted
1998
2006
2006
1999
2001
2007
2008

YES

Indiana

2009

YES
NO

Indiana
Iowa

2011
2006

NO
NO
NO

Louisiana
Louisiana
North
Carolina
OhioCleveland
Ohio-Autism
OhioEdChoice
Ohio-Special
Needs
OklahomaSpecial Needs
Oklahoma

2008
2010
2011

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Utah
Washington
D.C.
WisconsinMilwaukee
WisconsinRacine

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES

2011-12
Type
Enrollment
25,343 Individual Tax Credit
4,578 Corporate Tax Credit
115 Special Corporate Tax
Credit
22,861 Special-Needs Voucher
37,998 Corporate Tax Credit
2,965 Special Needs Voucher
8,131 Corporate and Individual
Tax Credit
590 Corporate and Individual
Tax Credit
3,919 Voucher
10,280 Individual and Corporate
Tax Credit
1,848 Voucher
186 Special Needs Voucher
N/A Special Needs Tax Credit

1995

5,603 Voucher

2003
2005

2,236 Special Needs Voucher
16,136 Voucher

2011

N/A Special Needs Voucher

2010

160 Special Needs Voucher

2011
2001
2006
2005
2004

N/A Corporate and Individual
Tax Credit
40,876 Corporate Tax Credit
341 Corporate Tax Credit
635 Special Needs Voucher
1,615 Voucher

1990

23,198 Voucher

2011

228 Voucher

Sources: Richard D. Komer and Clark Neily, School Choice and State Constitutions: A Guide to Designing School
Choice Programs (Washington D.C.: The Institute for Justice and The American Legislative Exchange Council,
2007); Malcom Glenn and Michelle Gininger, School Choice Now: The Year of School Choice, School Choice
Yearbook 2011-12 (Washington, DC: The Alliance for School Choice, 2012).
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operate at arm’s length from government. Programs ranged greatly in size. Several private
school choice programs enrolled fewer than 200 students, while the two largest programs, the
Florida and Pennsylvania corporate tax credit programs, enrolled almost 38,000 and 41,000
students, respectively. Programs also ranged in age. The oldest initiative, the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program, was enacted in 1990, while five new programs began in the 2011-12
school year. What all of these private school choice programs have in common, however, is that
they all permit parents to enroll students in sectarian religious private schools at government
expense.
Constitutionalism predicts that Blaine Amendments, enacted to proscribe government
support of sectarian religious schools, would prohibit states from operating private school choice
programs that include religious schools. If one were a Constitutionalist, one might expect that
legislators in states with Blaine Amendments would not even try to establish private school
choice programs that included sectarian religious schools because they could anticipate such a
program being struck down by state courts. Were legislators in Blaine-Amendment states to be
so bold as to attempt to enact school voucher programs that include sectarian schools, the courts
would swiftly and surely invalidate such laws, at least according to the Constitutionalist school
of thought. The Constitutionalist view of the relationship between Blaine Amendments and
state-level school voucher and tuition tax-credit programs is essentially a syllogism: If Blaine
Amendment, then no program.
The Constitutionalist syllogism clearly does not hold in this case. Eleven of the fourteen
states offering private school choice programs also have Blaine Amendments, meaning that 20 of

14

the 25 programs are offered in Blaine-Amendment states. Empirical analysis confirms what
even a cursory glance at the landscape reveals, that there is no relationship between a state
having a Blaine Amendment and a state offering a private school choice program. To test for
this relationship, we constructed a cross-tabulation of the 50 states and District of Columbia
organized by whether or not they have a Blaine Amendment and whether of not they have a
private school choice program (see table 2). Eleven of the 14 states that offer private school
choice programs also have Blaine Amendments, and nine of the 37 states that do not offer
private school choice programs do not. A relationship in a cross-tabulation table is best
understood by how observations cluster around the “primary diagonal”. If there is a strong
negative relationship between having a Blaine Amendment and not having a private school
choice program, as Constitutionalism predicts, the observations should cluster in the upper left
and lower right cells of the table. This would show the majority of the observations in the No
Blaine/Voucher cell and the Blaine/No voucher cell, implying that having a Blaine Amendment
prevents a state from having a private school choice program.
As table 2 clearly shows, almost half of the observations fall outside of the primary
diagonal. While there are a significant number of observations in the Blaine/No Voucher cell,
there are only three states that have no Blaine Amendment and a voucher program. In fact, the
lion’s share of states that have voucher programs also have Blaine Amendments. This outcome
is most likely explained by the fact that the vast majority of states (39) have Blaine
Amendments, but a much smaller number (14) have school choice programs. Statistically, a chisquared test on the cross-tabulation of state programs finds no evidence of a systematic
relationship (p-value=. 83) between a state having a Blaine Amendment and a state having a
private school choice program.
15

Table 2: Cross-Tabulation of States with and Without Private School Choice Programs by
Blaine Amendment

Voucher/Credit
No Voucher/Credit
Total

No Blaine
3
9
12

Blaine
11
28
39

Total
14
37
51

Interestingly, it appears that states that have a Blaine Amendment are more likely to have
a voucher program over a tax credit program. This is especially surprising since tuition tax
credit initiatives were pioneered as Blaine Amendment “workarounds” because the money that
finances them never touches government hands. Constitutionalists might grudgingly admit that
Blaine Amendments might not succeed in their intended purpose of absolutely prohibiting public
support for sectarian private schools but they might readily respond that at least the Amendments
influence how such programs must be structured.
By limiting the sample to states that offer private school choice programs and then crosstabulating the number of voucher programs and tax credit programs for these states, a clear
pattern develops. Of the nine states that offer voucher programs, eight of them have Blaine
Amendments (Table 3). However, of the three states that offer only a tax-credit program, only
one has a Blaine Amendment. A chi-squared test on the cross-tabulation of the subset of states
that have a voucher or tax credit program yielded a p-value of .02, confirming the positive
relationship between having a Blaine Amendment and having a voucher program. Not only are
private school choice programs with sectarian schools common in Blaine-Amendment states,
they are actually more likely to take the form of explicit government-financed and governmentrun programs than they are to take the form of tuition tax-credit Blaine “workarounds”. How can
this be? An examination of actual court cases involving Blaine Amendments and support for
sectarian private schools sheds some light on this question.
16

Table 3: Cross-Tabulation of States with Private School Choice Programs by Blaine
Amendment

Voucher
Tax Credit Only
Total

No Blaine
1
2
3

Blaine
8
1
9

Total
9
3
12

4. The Courts' Interpretation of State Blaine Amendments
As demonstrated in Section 2, far from being a benign effort to apply the principle of separation
of church and state at a time when the federal constitution's Religion clauses had not yet been
applied to state actions, the Blaine Amendments found in so many state constitutions were if
anything precisely the opposite -- an effort to preserve and protect Protestant hegemony over the
burgeoning public school systems, specifically by defeating Catholic efforts to obtain an equal
share of public funding for their parochial schools. These schools had been established by the
Catholics because, while they shared the belief of the public school advocates that public
education should include religious training, they recognized that the Protestant establishment that
controlled the public schools would not accommodate Catholic requests to temper the generically
Protestant nature of the public schools. As increasing numbers of Catholics immigrated to
America, particularly impoverished Catholics from Ireland and Italy, anti-Catholic sentiment
increased, including in the textbooks and curricula of the public schools. Events in Maine in
1854 illustrate this development. Maine was the state that James G. Blaine represented in the
U.S. Congress, where he proposed his amendment to the federal Constitution.
Amanda Donohoe, a young Catholic girl enrolled in the public schools of Ellsworth,
Maine, was expelled when, on the instruction of her father and her priest, she refused to read
17

from the Protestant King James Bible. She sued in state court and the Maine Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed her expulsion, upholding the Protestant practice of Bible reading without
commentary.20 Her priest, Father John Bapst, a Jesuit, began holding classes for Catholic
children in a newly built chapel. Encouraged by the town fathers, a Protestant mob burned down
the chapel and tarred and feathered Father Bapst, threatening to burn him at the stake. The same
year these events were transpiring in Ellsworth, Maine elected a Know Nothing as Governor, and
another mob burned down the Old South Congregational Church in Bath, Maine, because it had
been rented to Catholics for church services.
Thus it was the hostile environment presented to Catholics by the nondenominationally
Protestant public schools that led to the Catholics establishing their own schools, to inculcate
elements of their own religion, just as the public schools were inculcating common elements of
Protestantism. When, however, Catholics sought public funds for their schools the Protestant
establishment generally reacted with disdain, emphasizing that the public schools were
nondenominational, while the Catholic schools were "sectarian." Although there were rare
exceptions among the Protestants, such as Governor Seward of New York, who was supportive
of Catholic requests for a share of the public school funds, such apostates were vilified by the
larger Protestant community. That community supported efforts to constitutionalize the rejection
of Catholic demands, and the state Blaine Amendments were born. Accordingly, what every state
Blaine Amendment has in common is language rejecting public funds for sectarian schools. As
noted, sometimes the language prohibits funding of sectarian colleges as well, and even other
social service agencies like hospitals and orphanages.21 Because of the clarity with which Blaine
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Amendments serve their original purpose of rejecting direct funding of sectarian schools, there
are few court cases involving aid to religious schools, with most decisions involving other social
service agencies, such as the 1879 ruling in Trost v. Ketteler Manual Training School in which
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the state's Blaine Amendment did not prohibit the state from
paying for childcare services at religious institutions where the children were not required to
attend religious services and the state funds were not used to fund such services.22
After the U.S. Supreme Court in 1925 affirmed the right of parents to use private schools
to educate their children, a number of states began to experiment with various forms of funding
for families using private schools and for the schools themselves. Of particular interest for our
purposes is how the courts reacted to aid provided to families and to the children themselves,
because that is the form that school choice programs take. The experience of New York is
instructive. In the 1930's the New York legislature enacted legislation requiring the
transportation of all schoolchildren to their schools, including children attending religious
schools. Opponents of the program claimed it violated New York's Blaine Amendment adopted
in 1890. That Amendment, Article XI, Section 3, prohibits the state and its subdivisions from
using its public money or property "directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance ... of any school
or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious
denomination or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught." New York's highest
court, the Court of Appeals, ruled in Judd v. Board of Education that although busing the
children to their schools was primarily for the benefit of the children, it provided an incidental
benefit to the religious schools they attended and thus constituted "indirect" aid to those
control," and Article I, Section 11, a "super-Blaine" that provides that "no public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or to the support of any religious
establishment."
22
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schools.23 Although the specific result in Judd was reversed when the electorate amended the
Blaine amendment to allow transportation to religious schools, the issue of whether aid to
students constituted "indirect" aid to religious schools recurred again in 1967 when the Court of
Appeals was asked to rule on a Blaine Amendment challenge to a program of loaning free
secular textbooks to all schoolchildren, including those attending religious schools. In Board of
Education v. Allen the Court of Appeals overruled Judd, holding that the Amendment did not
prohibit aid to students that incidentally provided some benefit to the schools they
attended.24 The Court also held that such incidental benefits to religious schools did not violate
the federal Establishment Clause.
The plaintiffs appealed this latter ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed the
New York Court of Appeals decision regarding the Establishment Clause.25 This decision was
important because it reaffirmed the willingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold some forms
of assistance to students under the Establishment Clause, even though their religious schools
arguably derived some secondary or incidental benefit from the aid provided to their
students. The Supreme Court had first established this approach in Everson v. Board of
Education in which it upheld a student transportation program from New Jersey similar to the
one the New York Court of Appeals had struck down in Judd a decade before.26 The result in
Allen was surprising, however, since many observers had believed that decisions since Everson
had indicated the Court was willing to overrule that case if provided the opportunity. Because
under the federal structure of the governance in the United States a state law must pass muster
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under both the federal and state constitutions with the federal constitution reigning supreme, a
broad reading of the Establishment Clause as prohibiting aid to students that incidentally
benefitted their schools would have doomed any possibility of school choice programs in the
states. Conversely, the fact that the Supreme Court unequivocally upheld a school choice
scholarship program in the 2002 ruling Zelman v. Simmons-Harris means that the remaining
impediment to the permissibility of private school choice programs, if any, must be found in
state constitutions.27
New York's cases involving student aid demonstrate both the restrictive reading of state
Blaine Amendments, which finds that even incidental benefits to religious schools violates the
state's Blaine amendment (the Judd case), and the more generous reading that distinguishes
between providing direct and indirect benefits to the schools, which is prohibited, and providing
benefits to students that may incidentally benefit the schools they choose to attend (the Allen
case). But New York's cases involved relatively minor forms of student assistance,
transportation and secular textbooks, raising the obvious question of whether these two readings
also apply to the more substantial form of assistance represented by student voucher or tax-credit
scholarship programs.
Comparison of a pair of other cases indicates that courts do in fact apply these two
contrasting approaches to voucher and scholarship programs. Wisconsin is home to the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("MPCP"), which has provided school vouchers to lowincome families in Wisconsin's poorest performing school district since 1991.28 Wisconsin has a
Blaine Amendment, Article I, Section 18, which states that no money shall be drawn from the
27
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treasury for the benefit of religious societies or religious or theological seminaries, which is
understood to encompass religious schools. The teachers unions and other parties challenged the
constitutionality of the MPCP after it was expanded in 1995 to permit voucher recipients to use
their scholarships at religious schools, which in Milwaukee as everywhere else constitute the
majority of private schools. In Jackson v. Benson the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the program, holding that any benefits the religious schools received were
incidental to their having been drawn from the treasury for the benefit of the students.29
Like Wisconsin, Alaska also has a Blaine Amendment, and Alaska's Blaine also prohibits
aid to religious colleges as well as religious elementary and secondary schools. Alaska's Article
VII, Section 1 provides that "No money shall be paid from public funds for the direct benefit of
any religious or other private educational institution." As the forty-ninth state to join the Union,
Alaska's Blaine is the second youngest Blaine, older only than Hawaii's. Despite its youth,
however, Alaska's Blaine has already been used by the Alaska Supreme Court to invalidate both
a student transportation program and a college scholarship program, on the grounds that these
programs benefit private and religious schools and colleges.30 In the Sheldon Jackson College
case, the Alaska Supreme Court specifically rejected the idea that there was a legal distinction to
be made between giving money to the students and giving money to the colleges they chose to
attend, despite the fact that Alaska's Blaine prohibits only money paid for the direct benefit of
religious educational institutions, in contrast to, for example, New York's Blaine, which prohibits
public money from being used directly or indirectly for the benefit of religious schools and
colleges. New York's courts, faced with language plainly more expansive than Alaska's,

29

Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).

30

Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2nd 932 (Alaska 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 517 (1962) (invalidating transportation
program); Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979) (invalidating college scholarship program).

22

distinguish between direct and indirect aid to religious schools, which is prohibited, and
incidental aid, which is not. Alaska's courts, faced with language plainly more limited than New
York's, prohibiting only direct aid to religious educational institutions, refuse to distinguish
between direct, indirect, and incidental aid, viewing all as prohibited. It is almost as if for some
state courts the actual language of their Blaine Amendment hardly matters at all.
5. When Blaine Amendments ARE an Obstacle to School Choice: It’s the Politics, Stupid
Over the years there have been 14 state court cases that have ruled on school choice programs
and Blaine Amendments. In 10 of the 14 cases, courts have ruled in favor of school choice
programs (see table 4).
To test the Behavioralist hypothesis that politics might play some role in the rulings, we
classified all of the courts that have ruled on these cases by the political identification of the
judges that heard the case. In cases where the judges were elected we used the party that they
ran as a member of, and in cases where they were appointed we used the political identification
of the governor of the state at the time of their appointment. This is, admittedly, a crude measure
of political ideology, but it does give us a rough look at the role political orientation might play
in the jurisprudence on school choice cases. Nationally, the Democratic Party is opposed to
government-funded private school choice programs whereas the Republican Party supports such
initiatives.31
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Table 4: State Court Cases on School Choice and Blaine Amendments
Court Case

State

Program

Number
of Judges

Appointed by

+ School
Choice?

Chittenden v. Vermont Department of
Education (1999)

VT

Vermont Tuitioning system

5

D, D, D, D, D

No

Jackson v. Benson (1998)

WI

Milwaukee School Choice
program

7

R, R, R, D, D, R

Yes

Arviso v. Honig (1992)

CA

Failing Schools Voucher

7

R, R, R, R, R, R, R

No

Toney v. Bower (2001) and Griffith v.
Bower (2001)

IL

Education Tax Credits

7

R, D, D, R, R, R, R

Yes

Simmons-Harris v. Goff (1999)f/
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)

OH

Cleveland School Choice
Program

7

R, D, R, R, D, R, R

Yes

Holmes v. Bush (1999)

FL

Florida Opportunity Scholarship
program

7

D, D, R, R, D, D, D

No

Kotterman vs. Killian (1999)

AZ

Arizona Tax Credits

5

R, R, D, R, R

Yes

Doolittle v. Meridian Joint School
District (1996)

ID

Special education placements

5

D, D, D, D, D

Yes

Embry v. O’Bannon (2002)

IN

Dual-enrollment programs for
private school students

5

R, R, D, D, D

Yes

Commonwealth v. School Committee
of Springfield (1981)

MA

Public funds for Special
Education Services

5

R, R, R, D, D

Yes

Almond v. Day (1955)

VA

Vouchers for veteran's children

7

D, D, D, D, D, D, D

No

Gissy v. Board of Education (1928)

WV

Town Tuitioning

5

R, R, R, R, R

Yes

Davis v. Grover (1992)

WI

Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program

7

D, D, D, R, R, D, R

Yes

State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum
(1974)

WI

Private services for disabled
children

7

R, D, D, D, R, R, R

Yes

We created a simple index, the number of judges that we identified as Democrats over the
total number of judges that heard the case, to measure the political ideology of the court. Scores
ranged from 0 (if all judges were Republicans) to 1 (if all judges were Democrats). Rulings were
coded with a simple dichotomous dummy variable, 1 if the court ruled in favor of the school
choice program and 0 if the court ruled against the school choice program.
Calculating a simple, bivariate correlation on the political identity of judges and their
ruling on court cases shows a moderate negative relationship between judges that identify as
Democrats and positive private school choice rulings. The Pearson’s-r correlation coefficient
between the index of political ideology and the school choice dummy variable is -.37, indicating
a negative relationship of modest size.
Our partisan ideology variable is admittedly a crude measure. For example, it is not
unreasonable to believe that the five Democrats that ruled for school choice in Idaho in Doolittle
might be fundamentally different from the five Democrats that ruled against school choice in
Vermont in Chittenden. Both of these courts are most likely extremely different from the seven
Democrats that ruled against school choice in Virginia in 1955 in Almond. Short of developing a
comprehensive rating system, involving the meticulous coding of individual judges based on
multiple indicators of partisan ideology, which is a level of field research beyond the scope of
this initial descriptive study, our simple partisan ideology scale is as close as we can get to
capturing the effect of political preferences on judicial rulings regarding private school choice.
The fact that such a blunt instrument, which undoubtedly measures partisan ideology with a
substantial degree of error, still was systematically correlated with case outcomes at least
suggests that a more precise ideological measure would reveal an even clearer association
between judges’ partisan affiliations and their rulings on voucher and tuition tax-credit programs.

This result, coupled with earlier empirical analysis on the prevalence of private school
choice programs, underscores the finding that Blaine Amendments in and of themselves appear
to have little to do with the creation or constitutionality of a private school choice program. In
all 14 of these cases, states had Blaine Amendments, and in 11 cases, the courts ruled that private
school choice programs did not violate them. While it appears that to some extent politics was a
driver of the pattern of results, it is abundantly clear that a state having a Blaine Amendment was
not.

6. Conclusions
Two contrasting theories of what explains judicial rulings, Constitutionalism and Behaviorism,
have clashed in the scholarly literature about the U.S. Judiciary over the past half century or
more. Behaviorism has had the upper hand in those battles, especially more recently. The case
of Blaine Amendments and private school choice would seem to be an especially tough test for
Behaviorism, however, since the anti-aid amendments are explicit constitutional provisions with
the clear, historically established, intent of preventing governments from providing financial
assistance to private schools.
Our legal and empirical analyses, crude as they are, strongly suggest that, in this case,
politics matters more than constitutional language. State anti-aid amendments are unlikely to
preclude private school choice policies at the state level where Republicans dominate the
judiciary. When it comes to school choice policy-making, a state judiciary controlled by
Republicans functions as the equivalent of a “get-out-of-Blaine-jail-free” card. The more a given
court is comprised of Democratic judges, the less likely that court is to judge a private school
program to be constitutionally permissible. Under circumstances of Democratic control of the
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state judiciary, policy-makers would be well advised to design their private school choice
policies with tax-credit funding as opposed to direct government funding, so that judges inclined
to rule such programs unconstitutional have less ready access to Blaine Amendments to justify
their decisions. James G. Blaine can be blamed for many things, but no longer can he and his
legacy of anti-aid amendments be blamed exclusively or even primarily for standing in the way
of the government support of private schools through the schooling choices of parents.
One important caveat is that the Blaine Amendments in 39 state constitutions and the
Anti-Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution apparently have shaped private school choice
programs in one important way. In all cases, such programs provide resources directly to parents
who then channel the funds to sectarian religious schools only through the school choices that
they make. This funding procedure is in contrast to policies of government support of private
religious schools in many countries of Europe and Canada, where national governments pay
sectarian private schools directly to provide educational services to students.32 The fact that no
private school choice program involves the direct funding of sectarian religious schools by
governments would seem to represent a minor victory for Constitutionalism over Behaviorism.
Still, the fact that the mighty Blaine’s have been felled by the sling-shot pebble of indirect
funding mechanisms, especially when many Blaines explicitly proscribe even indirect support
for religious schools, if anything demonstrates how utterly complete is the triumph of politics
over Constitutionalism in this case; or, more specifically, how anachronistic the Blaine
Amendments have become in the debate over government-funded private school choice.
What does all this mean for American federalism? The fact that state constitutional antiaid amendments have virtually no influence on private school choice policies at the state level
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might appear to be a blow against federalism, at least judicial federalism. We see the fact that
Blaine Amendments sometimes fail to prevent states from operating private school choice
programs as more of a victory for federalism, especially political federalism. After all, the
virulent anti-Catholic bigotry that birthed the Blaine Amendments in the first place has,
thankfully, exited the scene in most if not all of the U.S. states. The fact that political conditions
on the ground have permitted many states to enact private school choice programs, even if 19th
Century constitutional provisions otherwise might seem to prohibit them, demonstrates that the
contemporary will of the people in individual states often can be successfully expressed through
the institutions of their state governments, including their state judiciary. Few validations of the
principles of American federalism could be stronger than that.
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